Frankly I was expecting SINAP to announce what has been going on with TMSR-LF1, and I'd be in a mad panic to leverage that... they haven't announced anything despite their reactor (presumably) having gone critical by now.
When they DO make their announcement it will still be a mad panic for me, but I am slowly chipping away at getting a narrative in place to be ready for it.
I've ordered (yesterday) a MacBook Pro 2021. The overall power is on-par with my main editing PC, but I've been using my 2012 MBP for video editing simpler videos because that's the only machine I could access most times. (Not a transposition typo... 2012 is my current laptop, 2021 is the MBP which will arrive by March 5th.)
For the past couple years it has been increasingly difficult to enter my basement lair and edit.
That doesn't impact these ORNL style videos very much (except in render-times) as I can do them on 2012 MBP, but it DOES make it harder to work on the primary narrative.
So I hope you-all can stick with this. I'll only be collecting once in 2022 so it isn't like I'll ding you twice in quick succession. And as I've always done, there will be ample heads-up before I collect. You'll preview the narrative before it is released, as I'm always looking for help fact-checking and everything else a fresh eyeballs can bring to a project.
NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) on Proliferation, Safeguards, PRO-X @ ORNL MSRW 2021
Proliferation is a downer topic, isn't it? There's 4 presentations in this video, all from NNSA. The PRO-X section was the only one released by ORNL. That was the last talk from NNSA, but ORNL only includes some talks (no Q&A) and there was a question at the very ... VERY end of the video of interest to Thorium advocates (37m42s) about how NNSA sees a "Pure U233" system.
Spoiler: "Doesn't seem like that would be a factor for safeguards." "I have no comment from security on this."
2022
Our family still hasn't caught Covid. We're fully vaccinated (and testing), but I expect at some point I'll disappear into a covid hole. I like to think that will be a period of incredible productivity... but we'll see.
Stay safe folks.
NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) on Proliferation, Safeguards, PRO-X @ ORNL MSRW 2021
Notes on the video's presentation follow...
DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Resources Session:
00:30 Office of Defence Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office Structure [NNSA's Jeff Chamberlin]
05:03 U.S. Nuclear Nexus [NNSA's Jeff Chamberlin continues]
09:00 ARISE (Advanced Reactor International Safeguards Engagement) [NNSA NPAC's Anagha Iyengar]
19:58 International Nuclear Security Resources for the U.S. Advanced Reactor Industry [NNSA's Katherine Holt]
29:41 PRO-X (Proliferation Resistance Optimization) [NNSA's Brian Waud]
36:07 Q&A: What is coming next Fiscal Year?
37:42 Q&A: Any comments on running a Pure U-233 System? (Thorium Pure Cycle.)
U.S. NUCLEAR NEXUS
Your Resource to Engage with NNSA on Global Deployment of U.S. Civilian Nuclear Technology Tool to provide a dynamic means for U.S. industry to interact with NNSA
Builds on "DOE-NNSA Recommendations and Resources for Advanced Reactor Developers"
A Single point of entry and liaison to collaborate with NNSA offices.
Interactive web portal and human interface that:
- Helps educate U.S. companies on navigating export control policies and regulations
- Supports U.S. industry by promoting understanding and timely implementation of safeguards by design, security by design, and proliferation resistance in nuclear systems
- Provides a human interface to shepherd requests for engagement
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL (NPAC)
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS: Build capacity of the international atomic energy agency and partner countries to implement international safeguards obligations.
NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS: Build domestic and international capacity to implement export control obligations,
NUCLEAR VERIFICATION: Support negotiation of and implement agreements and associated monitoring regimes to verifiably reduce nuclear weapons and nuclear programs.
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY: Develops approaches and strategies to address emerging nonproliferation and arms control challenges and opportunities.
What are IAEA Safeguards?
- Safeguards are measures applied by the IAEA to ensure a country's exclusively peaceful use
of nuclear material and facilities.
- Prevent state-sponsored proliferation
- Nuclear facilities exported internationally will likely be subject to IAEA verification
- Reactors and associated fuel cycle facilities may be subject to U.S. treaty and statutory obligations even if built in the U.S.
- NRC licensing requirements were not designed to address all aspects of IAEA safeguards
- IAEA safeguards is a treaty requirement undertaken by countries that enables the IAEA to independently verify that a country is not diverting nuclear material from declared activities.
What are the Benefits to U.S Vendors Considering International Safeguards?
- Observing the legal requirement that exported materials and facilities are safeguarded by the IAEA
- Making the job of IAEA inspector and operator / owner easier, thereby reducing safeguards burden
- Better positioning U.S. advanced reactor vendors in the global market
- Demonstrating corporate social responsibility / environmental, social, and governance criteria
- Reducing need for potentially costly retrofits and redesigns
- Reducing risk to scope, schedule, budget, and licensing
- Access to world-class technical experts with support from NNSA
Issues and Factors that may affect safeguards MSRs pose new challenges to address
- Large range of designs
- Variety of fuels and fuel cycles Fueling strategy
- Limited applicability of traditional safeguards technologies
- Likely need different approaches than LWR safeguards
- Learn from applying safeguards at reprocessing plants
- Limited access
- Increased reliance on process monitoring
Program Objectives
- Engage with the U.S. advanced reactor community to educate stakeholders on IAEA safeguards and promote the timely incorporation of safeguards by design (BD) in advanced reactor and associated fuel cycle facilities.
- Improve the safeguardability of future exports by partnering with industry to integrate SBD early in the design process
- Work with the IAEA to prepare for the evolving safeguards challenges
- Provide expertise on international safeguards requirements in coordination with other relevant USG programs.
What does an NNSA-U.S. vendor safeguards partnership look like?
Preliminary Reactor Design Scope: Awareness Building - IAEA safeguards requirements and inspection activities. Technical Analysis. Safeguards risk analysis of proposed concept. Identify nuclear material accountancy and verification R&D needs.
Demonstration / Final Concept Scope: Awareness Building - Regulation cross walk of IAEA vs. domestic vs. recipient country requirements.
Technical Analysis: Safeguards implementation roadmap. Safeguards technology R&D needs and gaps for specific concept.
Demonstrated Impact: Contributed to international licensing review process. Dialogue with IAEA.
International Nuclear Security Resources for the U.S. Advanced Reactor Industry
Policy Drivers:
- American leadership in nuclear technology + nonproliferation standards
- Enabling peaceful uses
- Meeting climate change goals
- INS AR Nuclear Security Program
- Partnering with U.S. nuclear reactor industry & embarking countries on nuclear security topics to:
-- Improve security of future US exports
-- Build nuclear security capacity in Newcomer countries
-- Advance the global nuclear security regime
Early adoption of security into novel reactor designs
- Early adoption of security principles enables efficient design, long-term cost savings, and a more secure world.
- Integrated security/safety systems can make industry design more competitive and cost effective.
- Prevent a nuclear terrorism incident and help future buyers uphold international legal obligations (CPPNM/A).
- Passive safety design still requires independent security analysis, and generally does not consider sabotage.
- HOW to consider security? Technical partnerships/"Security by Design" early, frequently, continuously.
- Extensive domestic and international experience in nuclear security systems design and evaluation using a performance-based approach to prevent theft or sabotage.
- Technical expertise, analysis, and modeling software available
WHAT can NSA/INS offer?
- Performance-based security evaluation and design validation assistance to support cost effective security systems in an evolving regulatory environment
- Target Identification: material characterization; consequence assessment for sabotage to inform security system design
- Risk & Cost informed Security System Design: detection, delay and response features for physical security + insider threat mitigation, cybersecurity
- Integrated Systems Design and Visualization: Visualization of
operational environment, interactions of NMAC for safeguards, cyber, and security systems
- Validation: ongoing validation of design using vulnerability assessment (VA) approaches and software
AR Security Technical Studies & Tools
- Security Economics: A tool that vendors and utilities can use to perform a cost-benefit analysis for design features which have the purpose of reducing O&M costs related to nuclear security.
- Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) online training. Understanding
of the DEPO methodology used to define, design, and evaluate physical protection systems for nuclear facilities.
- Advanced Reactor Target Sets. An approach which US-based companies can use to identify and evaluate advanced reactor theft/sabotage targets and vulnerabilities for a given protection strategy.
- Path Trace and Scribe3D. Intuitive. accessible, and highly visual security analysis software tools for rapid design evaluation of evolving, early phase, physical security system designs.
Finding ways to partner - Opportunities for Collaboration with NNSA on International Nuclear Security:
- Outreach & Exchange: Webinars, stakeholder meetings via GAIN/NEXUS, industry
associations/NGOs events.
- Technical Cooperation: INS-funded activities at DOE and NNSA Labs to support overall industry needs for secure global deployment.
- IAEA Guidance Contributions: Providing experts to INS supported IAEA activities on international security guidance for AR/SMRs.
- International Market: A network of existing global/regional partnerships, 20 years experience, and outreach to nuclear newcomers is starting to build strong NS infrastructure for 30+ embarking countries.
To develop a partnership with industry, the DOE National Labs can enter:
- Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs) to have detailed discussions of technologies that can include proprietary information.
- Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) to expand a company's proprietary capabilities or knowledge-set.
Proliferation Resistance Optimization (PRO-X) - Program Mission The Proliferation Resistance Optimization program maximizes proliferation resistance while optimizing performance for stated peaceful uses in nuclear facility and technology designs.
Program Targets:
• Limit the production and/or extraction of weapons useable nuclear material (WUNM)
• Reduce attractiveness of all applicable nuclear material
• Ensure that whole facility and capability is "scaled to meet" mission objectives
• Coordinate measures with facility operations, security, safety, safeguards and forensics to ensure compatibility and effectiveness
IAEA 10 MW Core - Results from Proliferation Resistance Optimization analysis on generic IAEA core:
• Decreased proliferation threat
• Reduced annual Pu production by 15-20%
• Results for 10 MW core can be scaled for higher power level reactors (i.e. 3x for 30 MW)
• Reduction of potential misuse is addressed through: Power level , Core cycle length
• Number, location and material of targets
Increased reactor performance - Increased thermal flux in one trap by 50% and maintained flux level in second trap. Optimization of reactor performance is directly affected by:
• Number of fuel elements (for same reactor power)
• Number and location of control elements
• Reflector material and geometry
• Number, location and material of targets
With completion of the independently validated PRO analysis on the IAEA 10MW core, it was proven that proliferation resistance optimization can be achieved on various reactor designs while maintaining or improving performance capabilities